Women's Empowerment

Women's Empowerment

Women's Empowerment 1
Don't Stick a Spoon in Marital Disputes?

Rui Costa, Olivia Masi, Beatriz Ribeiro, Matteo Sandi 

We estimate the impact of sentencing severity on the dynamics of domestic violence. The study uses ten years of merged individual-level administrative registers on domestic violence cases brought to the police and family linkages for Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil). Leveraging Brazil’s “Lei do Feminicidio”, which was implemented in March 2015 to include the crime of “femicide” in the Brazilian penal law, we find that sentencing severity significantly affects the behavior of both offenders and victims of domestic violence. While the policy change seemingly deterred potential offenders by reducing the incidence of domestic violence, victims of domestic violence became more likely to ask for protective measures and more reluctant to press charges against their abusive partners, as a framework of compensating mechanisms would predict. For a policymaker seeking to design effective sentences to combat domestic violence, the tension between these outcomes appears critical.

Women's Empowerment 1
Statistical Discrimination and Committes

J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz, Juan Jose Ganuza, Paola Profeta 

European Economic Review (2022) 

We develop a statistical discrimination model where groups of workers differ in the observability of their productivity signals by the evaluation committee. We assume that the informativeness of the productivity signals depends on the match between the potential worker and the interviewer: when both parties have similar backgrounds, the signal is likely to be more informative. Under this ‘‘homo-accuracy’’ bias, the group that is most represented in the evaluation committee generates more accurate signals, and, consequently, has a greater incentive to invest in human capital. This generates a discrimination trap. If one group is initially poorly evaluated (less represented into the evaluation committee), this translates into lower investment in human capital of individuals of such group, which leads to lower representation in the evaluation committee in the future, generating a persistent discrimination process. We explore this dynamic process and show that quotas may be effective to deal with this discrimination trap. We show that introducing a ‘‘temporary’’ quota allows to reach a steady state equilibrium with a higher welfare when groups have similar size in the population. If instead the discriminated group is underrepresented in the workers’ population (for example because of his race), restoring efficiency requires to implement a ‘‘permanent’’ system of quotas.